580. Prime Minister Pibul Assures Ambassador that Thailand Desires to Cooperate Despite Difficulties

 

In a conference with Prime Minister Songram Luang Pibul on the afternoon of November 20, 1941, Ambassador Tsubokami discussed the critical international situation, informing the Prime Minister of his talk with Foreign Minister Togo. During the conversation Prime Minister Pibul declared that Thailand wished to supply, to the extent of its ability, needed commodities to Japan and that, in regard to this question, the Anglo‑American position was very unreasonable. Although no proposal for an accord had been received from the British, it was possible that Great Britain would freeze Thailand's funds amounting to 160,000,000 baths in England, and forbid the exporting of oil and hemp bags.

It was Mr. Pibul's belief that the British authorities in the Far East wished to bring the Thaiese region into the conflict in order to retain the "status quo". It was, however, the Prime Minister's earnest desire that Japan should remain powerful until the end, and that after the war the Imperial government should occupy a position of power in the world. [1324]

The Japanese Ambassador had explained that America was unreasonably opposing Japanese demands and that there appeared to be no way to effect a solution. Not only would the aftermath of the international holocaust engulf Thailand, but it might endanger the establishment of the New Order in East Asia and the emancipation of the Asiatic peoples. [1325]

 

581. Japan Learns of Alleged British Proposal to Supply Thailand with Arms

 

Ambassador Tsubokami also reported that a British Minister had called on Prime Minister Pibul on November 18, 1941, according to a spy report. During this visit the British Minister had observed that on October 27, 1941, Great Britain had proposed a secret treaty with Thailand, promising to supply Thailand with arms; and that on November 17, 1941, he had received instructions from London that his country was now ready to furnish those arms.

 

582. British Minister Points to Thailand's Danger

 

According to the spy report the British Minister had observed that Great Britain was sorry for the mistakes she had made concerning Thailand in the past and had volunteered the information that there were a great many Japanese Fifth Columnists in Thailand at this time. Moreover, it was possible for Japan to now carry out her well‑laid plans for an invasion of the Southern Pacific. Before this should happen, Thailand should join with England, the United States, the Netherlands Indies and China in a defense camp. In this way Japan could be weakened by a war of nerves. To this proposal, Prime Minister Pibul had replied that Thailand had never yet been invaded by the Japanese army, and at the present time was sticking to strict neutrality. To the British Minister's interpolation that the Japanese could possibly attack Burma and pass through Thailand, Pibul had answered that the British forces could undertake the same action. If the Japanese forces did not pass through Thailand they would have to give an account to the Axis "for having danced to England's fiddle". [1326]

 

[1323] IV, 1163, 1150.

[1324] IV, 1164.

[1325] IV, 1165.

[1326] IV, 1166.

 

273

 

583. Japan to Receive Less Rubber Due to Production Decrease

 

Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire.  To prepare Japan to expect less rubber than was previously requested from Thailand, Ambassador Tsubokami notified the Home Office on November 22, 1941, that the actual shipment of rubber from the plantations would be fifty per cent less than ordinary years. From the beginning of 1941 until October, of the total 38,000 tons of rubber exported, 21,400 had gone to Japan, 7,300 had been sent to Shanghai, 1,200 to Manchukuo, 7,600 to the Malay States. He pointed out that the amount of rubber shipped to Japan in the future would not be equal to its requirements. [1327]

 

584. Supplies for Japanese Owned Drug Dispensary are Sent from Shanghai

 

On November 22, 1941, Shanghai wired the information that the drugs for the Chinese drug dispensary in Bangkok were being dispatched from Shanghai on the Toa Kaiun during the latter part of November. Details of the transfer were to be communicated by Mr. Awaya who was returning from Tokyo on the Kobe Mare on November 21. [1328]

 

585. Ambassador Tsubokami Requests Assistance for Five Newspapermen

 

Ambassador Tsubokami in a dispatch on November 22, 1941, requested that the five men sent by the Nichi Nichi newspaper be assisted to procure visas while they were in French-Indo China. These men were listed as Koichi Yanashita, Hiroshi Nakano, Hideo Ishibashi, Takashichi Saruwatari, and Ryosuke Taniguchi. [1329]

 

586. Thailand Consortium Makes Written Proposal Regarding Liquidation of Japanese Gold

 

Ambassador Tsubokami reported on November 21, 1941, that, although no concrete proposal had been advanced by the Consortium regarding the purchase of gold, they had made a written proposal to the Yokohama Specie Bank on November 19. According to the understanding of August 2, 1941, the Thaiese requested a shipment of gold equivalent to 10,000,000 bahts, 500,000 bahts of which was to be sent by air. Although Mr. Fukuda had delayed by saying that the matter would have to be referred to the Head Office, Ambassador Tsubokami advised that Japan ship the amount requested, and suggested that negotiations regarding the purchase of gold be begun. [1330]

According to the price of gold previously set in the agreement between Thailand bank authorities and the Yokohama Specie Bank, the price of gold upon its delivery to Bangkok would amount to 10 baht, (80 satan). However, now at the time of delivery in Bangkok the price appeared to be 11 baht. Since Japan assumed the cost of the delivery of the gold to Thailand, Foreign Minister Togo directed that Ambassador Tsubokami settle the price at 10 baht, 80 satan. [1331]

Foreign Minister Togo wired on November 24, 1941, that Japan would send 10,000,000 bahts by boat since it was not convenient to transport this amount by air. He asked that Ambassador Tsubokami arrange for a suitable boat. [1332]

 

587. Foreign Minister Togo Sends Secret Fund to Bangkok Foreign Office

 

On November 24, 1941, Foreign Minister Togo wired that he was sending 60,000 baht to the Bangkok Foreign Office to be kept in cash in a special secret fund. This fund was to be spent later as would be directed. [1333]

 

[1327] IV, 1167.

[1328] IV, 1168.

[1329] IV, 1169.

[1330] IV, 1170.

[1331] IV, 1171.

[1332] IV, 1172.

[1333] IV, 1173.

 

274

 

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

 

588. Bangkok Office Returns Code Machines to Japan

 

Since Thailand was close enough that the code machines could be transferred to Japan in comparative safety, rather than destroying them, Ambassador Tsubokami reported on November 24, 1941, that two obsolete code machines would be en route to Japan in care of the Captain of the Batavia Maru which would leave port on December 1, 1941. He asked that arrangements be made so that it would not be inspected when passing through customs. [1334]

 

589. Ambassador Tsubokami Believes that Thailand Should be Led to Cooperate Voluntarily

 

Ambassador Tsubokami on November 25, 1941, pointed out that should the Empire take decisive action in a southward advance, it would be necessary to bring Thailand into the Japanese camp, considering the necessity of a belligerent's rights to make clear the relations between sovereign and subjects. He also stated that Thailand should be led voluntarily to take an attitude of cooperation. In the event of an attack upon Burma and Malaya there would be a necessity of temporary infringement upon the territorial sovereignty of Thailand. After Japan's objectives had been attained, however, restoration would be made and the independence of Thailand would be respected. Should Thailand cooperate in a positive way with Japan, Thailand would be given full assurance that its swamp lands could be reclaimed in the areas concerned. Should Thailand's assets in England be frozen resulting in the fluctuation of the value of the country's money, Japan would make available sufficient funds to create a "bloc" money system, and should also prepare to provide petroleum and other essential commodities. The Ambassador re‑emphasized his points by saying that Thailand's sovereignty must not be impaired beyond the limits of necessity; that its standing as a nation should be maintained to the very last with military discipline to reassure the Thaiese populace; and that strict control should be exercised over any attempts at profiteering. [1335]

 

590. New Pro‑Japanese Party Advocates Collaboration with Japan

 

Inner circles of the Thailand government were taking a serious view regarding Thailand's foreign diplomatic policy toward the international situation. It was declared that the new pro‑Japanese party felt that one means of maintaining its government's independence was closer collaboration between Thailand and Japan. Concrete plans had been reportedly laid on November 23, 1941, when a secret meeting was held between Pibul, Tumaron, Min, Purrijitto and Pananow Nai Wanitto. [1336]

 

591. Prime Minister Pibul, Defense Minister Puromu Differ Concerning Thailand's Policy

 

A retransmission to Berlin on November 25, 1941, of a dispatch from Bangkok to Tokyo explained the feeling existing between Prime Minister Pibul and National Defense Minister Puromu over questions of policy and Nai Wanitto. While Mr. Pibul believed that the Thaiese policy should be one of strict neutrality, Mr. Puromu, on the other hand, believed that Thailand would be safer by definitely tying in with one side, thereby eliminating the possibility of being attacked by either side. When Prime Minister Pibul had questioned which side he would join, Minister Puromu had replied that they must wait and see which side won out in the Russo‑German war. [1337]

 

[1334] IV, 1174.

[1335] IV, 1175.

[1336] IV, 1176.

[1337] IV, 1177.

 

275

 

592. Ambassador Requests Funds for Machinations

 

Referring to a previous dispatch in which 6,900 yen had been requested for a machinations fund, Ambassador Tsubokami on November 25, 1941, again asked that this amount be transmitted to him immediately. [1338]

 

593. Ambassador Recommends that Crew of Fishing Vessel Escape to the Saigon District

 

On November 25, 1941, the Japanese Ambassador in Bangkok referred to a plan in which a fishing vessel belonging to Nagafuku of Singapore figured largely. It appeared that it was impossible for the vessel and the crew to make a getaway as first planned and that arrangements would have to be made for half of the crew to escape to the Saigon district. After considering this action and discussing it with Secretary Tahira, if the Foreign Minister thought this plan proper, he was asked to issue orders to this effect. [1339]

 

594. Japan Agrees to 25,000,000 Baht Exchange of Gold

 

Recommending on November 25, 1941, that the negotiations then underway be adjourned, Foreign Minister Togo declared that the Finance Ministry had agreed to the gold purchase totaling 25,000,000 bahts. Furthermore, judging from the volume of goods Japan had received from Thailand on indent purchase, he informed Ambassador Tsubokami that it would be necessary to have the equivalent bahts available in Japan for many months yet. [1340]

Referring to Tokyo's question effecting the exchange of gold at 10 bahts, 80 Satan, Ambassador Tsubokami in a dispatch on November 26, 1941 wired Tokyo concerning the difficulties involved in the exchange. Because of the present problems he suggested that Japan should resort to a political solution and that actual settlement of the question should be effected by February, 1942, when the credit agreement between the two countries should expire. [1341]

 

595. Japan Discovers Discrimination in Thaiese Censorship

 

In his attempt to discover the basis on which Thailand conducted its censorship, the Ambassador to Thailand also explained that letters passed between Japan and Thailand frequently appeared to be censored, but letters passing through the country seemed to be untouched. Since documents between the Foreign Minister and the Japanese Embassy in Thailand did not go through the post office, these were not censored. [1342]

 

596. Ambassador Advises That Railway be Completed Quickly

 

The suggestion that the Siamese railway be completed by Japan as quickly as possible was sent to Japan on November 26, 1941, by the Ambassador in Bangkok. Moreover, he requested that Japanese companies and responsible authorities in Siam get in touch with his office before handling foreign trade. [1343]

 

597. Foreign Minister Togo Asks that Additional Rubber be Secured

 

In a dispatch designed, primarily, to list the schedules of the Japanese Marus carrying rubber from Thailand to Japan, Foreign Minister Togo commented on Ambassador Tsubokami's wire concerning the general total of imports amounting to 38,000 tons. In his opinion it was still possible to procure 10,000 tons of rubber and he requested that the Ambassador spur Japanese merchants to complete the arrangements for the rubber. [1344]

 

[1338] IV, 1178.

[1339] IV, 1179.

[1340] IV, 1180.

[1341] IV, 1181.

[1342] IV, 1182.

[1343] IV, 1183.

[1344] IV, 1184.

 

276

 

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

 

598. Japan Plans to Investigate Raw Opium Market

 

The Foreign Minister requested that an investigation regarding the supply and demand of raw opium in Thailand be conducted. He asked that the amount consumed, the amount produced, the imports and the price at which the Purchasing Bureau obtained raw opium and the price at which it retailed be listed. [1345]

 

599. Consul General Asada Carries Important Papers to Thailand

 

Foreign Minister Togo declared on November 27, 1941, that Consul General Asada, returning to Japan, was carrying papers regarding the secret negotiations with Prime Minister Pibul. The Foreign Minister directed that the Ambassador should consult Consul General Shunsuke Asada in any matter pertaining to Thailand. [1346]

 

600. High Ranking Official Says Thailand Friendly to Japanese Army

 

The pertinent remarks of a high ranking Thaiese which were learned through the associate editor of the Bangkok Times, Mr. Ado, via a Japanese secret agent, were reported to Tokyo on November 27, 1941. According to the high ranking official the Thailand government sympathized with the aims of the Japanese army and declared that the recent strict observances of neutrality were merely gestures toward Great Britain and America. The official stated, moreover, that should the Japanese army invade Thailand that country was not prepared to repel the invasion and that if it were tactfully carried out the people would probably settle down peacefully in three or four months feeling safe. [1347]

In spite of this report, however, Japanese officials in the Thaiese capital reported on November 28, 1941, that Thailand had begun to draft men, although the conscription was not heavy. As an example, it was found that of the 232 persons working for nine Japanese companies, seven had been drafted. [1348]

 

601. Agreement Stipulates Continuance of Gold Exchange to March, 1942

 

The Japanese Ambassador wired Tokyo that a conference had been held between Mr. Yoichi Fukuda of the Yokohama Specie Bank and Minister Kohei Futami, Uychiyama, the Finance Ministry Advisers, and Prince Aitsu concerning the transfer of 25,000,000 bahts. Declaring that Japan wished to continue the exchange of gold until the end of March, 1942, Mr. Fukuda had obtained a promise that the Finance Minister would take up this case at a Cabinet meeting on December 3, 1941. It was hoped that the Finance Minister would eventually request the transfer of American dollars only, with Thaiese funds being held in reserve. [1349]

 

602. Ambassador Requests Additional Secret Fund

 

On November 28, 1941, Ambassador Tsubokami requested 100,000 yen for the purpose of carrying on intelligence and enlightenment propaganda in the eventuality that remittances from Japan might cease. Since it had been decided to enlarge upon and carry out a propaganda policy which had been previously decided, the Ambassador stated that he would send the written plan to Tokyo at a later time. [1350]

 

[1345] IV, 1185.

[1346] IV, 1186.

[1347] IV, 1187.

[1348] IV, 1188.

[1349] IV, 1189.

[1350] IV, 1190.

 

277

 

603. Ambassador Tsubokami Explains Objectives of Prime Minister Pibul's Speech

 

In regard to Prime Minister Pibul's broadcast to his people on November 27, 1941, the Japanese Ambassador declared that the speech had been made to lay the groundwork for a diplomatic about face and to warn those who were influenced by British propaganda. During a talk with Minister Futami, Mr. Pibul had been particular to refer to this point. [1351]

During the discussion Pibul revealed that British propaganda had been fluctuating and that not a few Thaiese had been in the employment of Great Britain. He had told Minister Futami that in his talk to be given later in the day he would declare that it was Thailand's policy to stick to neutrality and would advise them not to be taken in by propaganda from foreign sources. Minister Futami replied that should Japanese forces in French Indo‑China be forced to embark on a local course of action, he would like the Prime Minister to realize that such action would not in itself be aimed at Thailand. He promised that any military action would be in behalf of Pibul's country and he asked for his cooperation. The Prime Minister then revealed that because of the insecurity of his own position, he had not dared to inform the Thaiese people of his hopes that Japan would occupy French Indo‑China, considering Thailand's policy of neutrality. Should the country be threatened by some Japanese action supported by the Prime Minister, Mr. Pibul would be cut off, "isolated, a lone man". [1352]

 

604. Ambassador Tsubokami Suggests that Thailand be Persuaded to Cooperate

 

Discussing the present situation in Thailand and laying the groundwork whereby Thailand could be justifiably invaded by the Japanese army, Ambassador Tsubokami sent a dispatch to Tokyo on November 29, 1941. From the standpoint of face‑saving and also for material reasons, it would be better if Thailand should abandon her neutrality policy by formally requesting cooperative action "from the nation concerned" rather than by being compelled to consent to considerations by pressure brought to bear.

This had been suggested to Mr. Luang Sindhu, Minister of Education, and Mr. Wanitto in a conference with Naval Attaché Yoshika at which time Mr. Luang Sindhu had volunteered to handle the matter and to put forth every effort for its realization. Through these two Thaiese officials the Japanese had learned that discussions in the Cabinet concerned the real intentions of Japan or the real meaning of the East Asia co‑prosperity plan, the influence of the Japanese southward expansion policy, the extent of commodity supplying, and the duration of time of stationing troops. Led by Nai Wanitto the pro‑Japanese group in the Cabinet in advocating the establishing of a union between Japan and Thailand had been having better success with the result that their position had become more favorable. Although the matter was as yet unconcluded, the opposition since about November 25, 1941, had kept silent. [1353]

 

605. Thaiese Government Officials Still Vote for Neutrality

 

In spite of the discussion of joint military action by the pro‑Japanese faction, Thailand still desired to maintain strict neutrality and Ambassador Tsubokami explained that the nation which made the first move would be regarded as Thai's enemy. Considering this, the Japanese Ambassador suggested that Britain be forced to aggression, with Japan assuming the position of Thai's helper. To effect this, Japan should land her troops near the British territory of Kotaparu, forcing Britain to invade Thailand from Patanbessa. This would result in Thailand's declaring war on Great Britain. [1354]

However, should Japan use the method of presenting an ultimatum to Thailand, it might be difficult to limit the conflict. officials in Banekok wired on December 3. 1941. Details

 

278

 

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

 

concerning this subject were to be reported to the Vice‑Chief of the General staff through Staff Officer Yahara. [1355]

 

606. Officials Originate Plan To Force Mr. Pibul to Declare His Position

 

Reportedly concerned over Prime Minister Pibul's "weak character" were Mr. Luang Sindhu and Mr. Wanitto who suggested a plan whereby Mr. Pibul would be forced to declare his position. One method would be for Japan to remove forcibly some undesirable Japanese from Thailand, subsequently publicizing this as the forerunner of a general evacuation of Japanese nationals. Such action would speed favorable developments, the Ambassador said. [1356]

 

607. Ambassador Sends List of Codes to be Destroyed

 

On November 30, 1941, Ambassador Tsubokami transmitted a list of the codes which the Bangkok office planned to destroy, requesting that any objections be sent by return wire. [1357]

 

608. Japanese Ambassador Suggests Counter Propaganda Tactics

 

To counter British propaganda, the Japanese Ambassador suggested that Japan have published in English and Thaiese newspapers editorials stressing that the colored races in Australia and North America were suppressed, that Japan's objective was not Thailand, and that small nations had been victimized by British propaganda and schemes in the war between Germany and Britain. [1358]

 

609. Foreign Minister Togo Remits Funds for Propaganda Purposes

 

The ¥100,000 earlier requested by Bangkok for propaganda purposes had been sent, Foreign Minister Togo advised Ambassador Tsubokami on December 1, 1941. [1359]

 

610. Japanese Officials Set Up Secret Wireless Communication Facilities

 

In the event that communications between Bangkok and Tokyo were cut off, secret wireless communication facilities had been set up between Bangkok and the Domei Press Office in Saigon. [1360] Moreover, to meet any emergency situation, Japanese officials in Bangkok were concerned with arranging the Thaiese currency problem, and requested, on December 3, 1941, that a suitable person be appointed to the Embassy staff for this purpose, and sent as soon as possible. [1361]

In view of the urgency of concealing Japanese plans, it was deemed inadvisable by the Vice‑Chief of the Japanese General Staff to withdraw Japanese fishing boats from Singapore. For the time being, then, it was decided that this action should not be taken. [1362]

 

611. Nai Wanitto Believes Thailand Will Cooperate with Japan in Two or Three Days

 

During a three‑hour Cabinet speech, Prime Minister Pibul had declared that "The time had come when Thailand must cast its fate with that of Japan," Ambassador Tsubokami reported

 

[1355] IV, 1195.

[1356] IV, 1194.

[1357] IV, 1196.

[1358] IV, 1197.

[1359] IV, 1198.

[1360] IV, 1199.

[1361] IV, 1200.

[1362] IV, 1201.

 

279

 

on December 4, 1941. This had been approved by a standing vote by Mr. Luang Sindhu, Mr. Boriban, Vice‑Commander Rwankurien, Minister of Defense Ruansweri and the Chief of the General Staff Ruanbititto Songhram. Mr. Wanitto believed that Thailand would switch over to Japan within the next two or three days. [1363]

In spite of this belief, however, it was also reported on December 4 that the Siamese government had sent two men to talk with the Commanding Officer of the British Far Eastern Army at Singapore. These men were to observe the condition of the British forces and to deal with the matter of purchasing material. [1364]

 

612. Thailand Sends Official Reply to Financial Proposal

 

On December 4, 1941, the terms of the memorandum regarding the financial negotiations between Thailand and Japan were wired to Tokyo to be regarded as the official reply of Thailand. Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire. It had been handed to Minister Futami on December 4, 1941, and stipulated that the Yokohama Specie Bank would transfer 25,000,000 baht in gold to the Treasury Department. [1365]

 

613. Propaganda to be Disseminated in Thailand is Sent to Japan

 

In accordance with his previously advocated policy of disseminating propaganda, Ambassador Tsubokami forwarded communications to Japan which, if broadcast in English and Thaiese, could be heard by the Thaiese populace. The propaganda had been originally written by the Japanese special correspondent in Bangkok. [1366]

 

614. British and American Residents Evacuate Bangkok

 

Meanwhile, on December 5, 1941, the Ambassador informed Tokyo that British and American residents were beginning to evacuate Bangkok but that the number going to British Malaya was not large. He reported that many were going to the vicinity of Hoanin and South Thailand. Moreover, he informed Tokyo that a conference of delegates reporting the evacuation had been held at the British Legation on December 3, 1941. [1367]

It had been learned that approximately thirty Americans living in Chiengmai, Lampang, Prae and other cities in that vicinity had met at a hospital in Chiengmai on November 30 to discuss the matter of their evacuation. The result of their discussion was not included in the dispatch transmitted from Bangkok to Tokyo on December 2, 1941. [1368]

 

615. Ambassador Informs Tokyo of Schedule of Batavia Maru

 

On December 6, 1941, the Ambassador transmitted the schedule of the Batavia Maru as well as cargo which it would carry to Osaka. Scheduled to sail on December 5, 1941, it would touch port at Saigon and Keelung. [1369]

 

616. Japan to Issue Proclamation on December 8, 1941

 

Tokyo informed Ambassador Tsubokami that December 8, 1941 would be the declaration or proclamation day as had been decided by the liaison conference of December 6, 1941. A receipt was to be sent immediately from Bangkok as soon as this dispatch had been received. [1370]

 

[1363] IV, 1202.

[1364] IV, 1203.

[1365] IV, 1204.

[1366] IV, 1205.

[1367] IV, 1206.

[1368] IV, 1207.

[1369] IV, 1208.

[1370] IV, 1209.

 

280

 

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

 

617. Invasion of Thailand to be Announced by Separate Wire

 

In a message which was badly garbled in transmission from Tokyo to Bangkok on December 7, 1941, it was learned that Japan would announce its invasion of Thailand by separate wire as soon as the Imperial government's decision became clear. Ambassador Tsubokami was instructed to arrange to defeat Britain's plots by choosing the most appropriate statement in the announcement as the Embassy's statement. He was urged to exercise every precaution to insure that the Imperial forces' objectives would not be exposed in making these announcements. [1371]

 

618. Foreign Office Provides Ambassador with Varying Explanations in Case Occupation is Peaceful or by Force

 

According to separate message "A", which was to be applicable should the occupation be accomplished peacefully, it was pointed out that the relations between Thailand and Japan had reached the highest point of their friendship and that the two countries together would strive toward the stabilization of the Far East and towards the creation of a co‑prosperity sphere. The Ambassador could use any of the following phrases; Japan and Thailand had reached an agreement on the joint defense of Thailand or had reached an agreement of a certain kind of alliance; or Thailand had agreed to join the Tripartite Pact; or Thailand agreed to permit the passage of Japanese troops through Thailand. [1372]

In the event of a forceful occupation, it was to be explained that for some time past the British had been massing large numbers of troops on the Malayan and Burmese borders under the pretense of defense. Since these British troops had attacked Thailand, the Imperial government had begun to occupy Thailand as an emergency defense measure. It was to be pointed out that Japan had absolutely no intention of conducting an invasion or of interfering with Thailand's independence and that full cooperation was expected from the officials and people of Thailand. [1373]

 

619. Thailand Gives Right of Passage Through Territory to Japanese Army

 

An agreement signed by the Japanese Ambassador and the Thaiese Minister of Foreign Affairs was sent to Tokyo on December 8, 1941. As representatives of their respective governments they agreed that Thailand should give to Japan the right of passage through Thaiese territory, extending all necessary facilities for the said passage of Japanese forces and to take every measure to avoid conflict between the Japanese and Thaiese forces. The particulars for the execution of the agreement should be determined between the military authorities of the two countries. Japan by this agreement guaranteed that the independence, sovereignty and honor of Thailand would be respected. [1374]

 

620. Tokyo Announces Armies' Advance and Occupation of Bataan Island

 

In a war situation report on December 9, 1941, the Vice‑Chief of the General Staff announced that as of December 8 Japanese units had landed in Thailand, Malaya, and Kota Bahru (on the east coast of Malaya) and were making progress in setting up their bases in preparation for further advancement.

One transport had been lost, as well as eleven unidentified units and several fighter planes. Japanese units had succeeded in damaging forty‑four and shooting down fifteen allied planes. He announced that Thailand had been invaded at 1230 (I zone time) on December 8 and that the units which had landed south of Bangkok were advancing toward the city.

Japanese units had also occupied Bataan Island north of the Philippines, and the army had been bombing northern Luzon, while the navy had been bombing the central and southern part of the island. [1375]

 

[1371] IV, 1210.

[1372] IV, 1211.

[1373] IV, 1212.

[1374] IV, 1213.

[1375] IV, 1214.

 

281

 

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE :1978 O ‑ 244‑824 Vol. IV Pt. 1