305. Asama Maru to Evacuate Japanese Officials and Businessmen

 

By order of the Secretary to the. Minister of the Navy, Lieutenant Commander Hatakeyama of the Medical Corps was directed to return to Japan on the Asama Maru. [684]

Since, as previously mentioned, this was to be the last evacuation vessel to Manila, members of the trade promotion organization were to be induced to return to Japan on the Asama Maru, or Fuji Maru, which had been assigned to the Dutch East Indies for evacuation purposes. [685] Consul Kihara, however, because of urgent business in Tokyo, was ordered to return to Japan immediately by plane rather than to await the scheduled accommodation by steamer. [686]

According to a dispatch, transmitted from a Mr. Shirai in Manila to the Department of Commerce and Industry, the Consul General had suggested that the branch office be closed temporarily and the personnel be returned to Japan since there was no business at the time. [687]

 

306. Japanese Legation Staff Obtains a Loan

 

A dispatch, retransmitted to Tokyo and Washington, reported that the high Commissioner in Manila had granted permits for a loan and for the receipt of the outstanding balance of the Legation's allowance. However, no instructions relative to the needed cancellation of the freezing order had yet been received. Moreover, a message from the Washington Embassy had asserted that twenty‑five thousand pesos for operating expenses in Manila and additional sums for the higher staff members had been approved. The Manila Legation requested a confirmation of these appropriations. [688]

 

[684] IV, 547.

[685] IV, 548.

[686] IV, 549.

[687] IV, 550.

[688] IV, 551.

 

158

 

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

 

PART C‑JAPANESE DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITIES THROUGHOUT THE WORLD

 

(e) Japanese‑Mexican Relations

 

307. Vice Consul Kobayashi Transports Secret Documents to San Francisco

 

Minister Yoshioki Miura was instructed to send a member of his staff to San Francisco to meet Vice Consul Ichizo Kobayashi on the Hikawa Maru, since secret documents for the Mexican Embassy and for all South American offices would be carried by that official. [689]

 

308. Minister Miura Sends to Tokyo a Resume of Comments on Mexico's Position in the Event of a Japanese‑American War

 

In a message to Tokyo on October 23, 1941, Minister Miura declared that in the event of the United States becoming involved in the war, it was generally believed that Mexico would either follow its example or assume a status similar to being in the war. At an informal dinner party which the Mexican Minister had given on October 21, former Vice Minister of Communications and Finance M. C. Rolland had discussed the attitude that Mexico might take should hostilities develop between the United States and Japan. He believed that the United States would immediately occupy Mexican bases and strengthen anti-Axis activities in Mexico. Since the government which was formed to support the United States, naturally was following a course of cooperation, should the United States ask Mexico to declare war, the government would likely comply at once. Although the populace in general was friendly toward Japan, Mexican politics and foreign affairs were now manipulated entirely by a small number of politicians and military men who were not worthy to be called military men. Since the people were absolutely powerless, it would be a mistake to expect anything of them. Mr. Rolland declared that the only chance of a change in Mexico's present policy would occur if Germany gained the supremacy in Europe, and Japan in Asia, while the United States, on the other hand, would face a national crisis because of economic breakdown and for other reasons. [690]

 

309. Navy Department Retracts Alleged Statement by Secretary Knox of "Immediate Action Within 24 Hours"

 

On October 25, 1941 Minister Miura in Mexico learned confidentially from an executive of the Excelsior newspaper of the statement made on October 24 by Secretary of the Navy Knox referring to the near approach of the crisis between Japan and America. Secretary Knox, in the statement which reached the newspaper office at noon, had asserted that there would be "imminent action" in the Far East "within twenty‑four hours". At a request from the Navy Department, word had gone through two hours later to the effect that the phrase "within twenty‑four hours" should be deleted. [691]

 

310. Minister Miura Plans to Return to Japan

 

An unidentified Japanese official in Mexico (probably Minister Miura) was advised by Tokyo on October 27 that he would be permitted to announce his intention to return to Japan only after he had made definite arrangements for his passage home. He was informed that there was no space on the Terukawa Maru, although it might be possible to find space on

 

[689] IV, 552.

[690] IV, 553.

[691] IV, 554.

 

159

 

the Hikawa Maru sailing from Seattle on November 4. Another possibility was the President Line vessel which sailed from San Francisco to Shanghai. The official was requested to choose a method of transportation and to advise the Home Office. [692]

On November 3, Minister Miura wired that the chances of getting reservations at San Francisco were very slim. It would be necessary, the Minister said, to announce his intention of returning home by November 14 or 15, at the very latest, since four or five days would be required to travel by rail to San Francisco. After leaving Mexico, the Minister said, he couldn't very well "come sauntering back again because he couldn't get ship accommodations in San Francisco". In addition, he pointed out that if by chance he were successful in finding accommodations at San Francisco, there was the danger that he would become stranded in the Philippine Islands or in Hawaii should certain developments occur in Japanese-American relations. In any event, he, as Minister of the Imperial Government, would be placed in an undignified position which might result in criticism of the government should any of the anticipated events materialize. For these reasons, he suggested that he apply openly and directly to the United States Government to reserve accommodations or he could, as an alternative, remain in Mexico. In spite of the fact that his position there would be exceedingly difficult, he would nevertheless endeavor to carry out the instructions of the Foreign Minister to the best of his ability. [693]

 

311. System of Importing Rayon Undergoes a Change

 

A fact, which would be announced in a few days in the official Mexican Gazette, was reported to Tokyo on November 6, 1941, namely, the cancellation by the Economics Department of the import certificates of the Rayon Distributing Company. The subsidy system was to be dispensed with on November 10, Minister Miura said. In the future, the importation of rayon would take place in a manner totally different since no subsidy would be given to a controlled distributing company and the importation of rayon could be carried on by anyone who was willing to pay a tariff of one peso per kilogram. The change in the system had been brought about by the fact that the distributing company, through its system of importation and distribution, had never achieved the expected results; consequently, Mexico was very hard up for rayon. In cognizance of this fact, Japan should watch carefully to see that no rayon was being transshipped from China to Mexico. Since the Minister had himself been given a report that Itoochuu had shipped some two thousand cases to Chile, he felt that the rayon shipments might be going by way of Chile and Argentina to Mexico. [694]

 

312. Panama Incident Has No Noticeable Effect in Mexico

 

On November 9, 1941 Minister Miura wired that the announcement of the Panama Incident in Mexico had had no noticeable effects in that country. The Universal had, on November 8, published a telegram stating that Japan had protested against the new trade laws which curtailed Japanese businesses in Panama. The report gave Panama's reply, namely, that this protest constituted interference in the internal affairs of Panama. As yet, there had been no confirmation of the report from other sources. [695]

 

[692] IV, 555.

[693] IV, 556.

[694] IV, 557.

[695] IV, 558.

 

160

 

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

 

313. Mexican Newspapermen Return from Japan Via Vancouver and Cuba

 

Two Mexican newspapermen, Mr. Jose Llerco and Mr. Araisa, who had been sent to Japan at the expense of the Japanese Government were, according to a dispatch from Tokyo on November 13, returning to their country on the Hikawa Maru. Since the American authorities had refused to credit the transit visas on the ground that Mr. Llerco was anti‑American, they had been forced to disembark at Vancouver and return to Mexico by way of Cuba. As both of the men were exceedingly competent reporters, the Foreign Minister felt that they would be of great help in Japanese machinations in Mexico. During their visit in Japan, they had met all of the prominent men and had a very clear picture of Japan's position.

Mr. Llerco was, the Foreign Minister explained, under contract to the Yomiuri newspaper as its Mexican correspondent. [696]

 

314. Courier Inoma Dispatched to San Francisco

 

In deference to Tokyo's request that a courier be sent to San Francisco to pick up secret papers which were being brought by Courier Oshino, Minister Yoshioki Miura reported on November 17 that Courier Inoma had been dispatched for this mission. Courier Inoma was scheduled to proceed to Los Angeles for explanation pertaining to these papers. It was further asked that Courier Kosaka, who would pass through Mexico City on November 19, stop in that city on his way to Washington. [697]

 

315. Mexican Reporter Returning from Japan Expresses His Gratitude for Hospitality Extended

 

On his return to Mexico, Mr. Araisa, one of the Mexican reporters sent to Japan, had visited a member of the Japanese Legation in his private apartment. At that time he had expressed his deep gratitude to the Japanese, particularly to the Investigation Bureau, for the welcome and kindness he had received during his visit to Japan. He explained, however, that he and Llerco, having visited Japan on the invitation of the Japanese and having taken quite a sum of money with which to make the trip, were now accused of being spies. For this reason he hesitated to call at the Embassy or the Chancellery since they were not allowed too much freedom of movement.

Furthermore, Llerco, who, with his brother, published the newspaper Hoy, had been fired while he was in Japan, and the people in Mexico were more angry with him than they were with Mr. Araisa.  Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

For the present, these two men were unable to write articles favorable to Japan. This was unfortunate since hostile writers would be producing a great deal of anti‑Japanese propaganda. He promised, however, that when the time was ripe, they, too, would put pens to work for Japan's benefit. [698]

 

316. Mexico Enforces Stricter Passport Policies

 

That passport restriction were becoming more strictly enforced was reported to Tokyo on November 18 by Japan's Minister in Mexico. Although those who had suffered persecution by the abolition of passports were political refugees as in the case drawn up by Ambassador Bureseda, Mexican Ambassador to Panama, which had no bearing on the present question, it still boiled down to whether or not the Mexican Government wished to exercise clemency where Japan was concerned. Mexico, he said, did not now recognize the passports of laborers, and the only way to get into Mexico was by way of a farmer's or investor's passport. In some cases, the Mexican Government requested that only 750 pesos be put up to return home in

 

[696] IV, 559.

[697] IV, 560.

[698] IV, 561.

 

161

 

case of emergency but, in other cases, as much as from 60,000 to 110,000 pesos might be necessary.

Even important reporters had been denied entry into the country as in the case of special correspondents Asano and Nakano. Although negotiations concerning them had been going on over a period of months, there did not seem to be much chance of their being admitted. [699]

A searching examination was being conducted with a view to expelling all foreigners who had passports with flaws, and the number of Japanese who might fall victim to this was approximately one hundred.

The former policy of extending the passports of Japanese citizens whose time was up had been discontinued, and they were allowed to wait only until the next ship could come to evacuate them.

Naturally, Minister Miura said, this situation existed as a result of Mexican‑American relations; and, as in the case of Panama, it was not a policy for humane considerations but simply a question of their relations with the United States.

The predicament of the Japanese was pitiful beyond words and the Imperial Government itself was on the spot in this respect. Assuring the Foreign Minister that he himself was not attempting to escape any labor or embarrassment, he pointed out that diplomats in Mexico must be careful not to say anything to get the countries they represented into trouble. As soon as the Foreign Minister had evolved an answer to this question, he asked that he be instructed immediately. [700]

 

317. Minister Miura Gives His Opinion Regarding Oil Agreement Between United States and Mexico

 

Following the announcement on November 19 of the United States‑Mexico agreement concerning the oil question, Minister Miura transmitted his opinions of the matter on November 20. As a reason for the rapid accomplishment of the agreement, he suggested that the United States could not afford to have a shadow fall upon her many relations with Mexico, which played the part of flagman for the various countries in Central and South America. The United States found it impossible to acquiesce to any policy which would delay the completion of continental defense in Mexico.

Furthermore, Mexico had reached a condition of great uneasiness because of insufficient raw materials and capital, as had already been reported. Added to this was the dissatisfaction of the people in regard to the existing economic agreement as well as the threat of adverse trade conditions never before seen in Mexico. Since the government found its position untenable, the United States cleverly took advantage of all this to conclude the oil agreement. [701]

 

318. Agreement Signifies Desire for Mutual Understanding Between United States and Mexico

 

Foreign Minister Ezequiel Padilla had explained to newspaper reporters that the agreement removed the obstacles to close cooperation, which were possible sources of friction if postponed. In establishing the agreement, proof had been given of the desire on the part of both countries for mutual understanding and honest friendship. The Japanese Minister added that important writers in Mexico had declared the agreement signified Mexico's gradual yielding to the United States, to the point where it was no longer possible to move either hand or foot. [702]

 

[699] IV, 562.

[700] IV, 563.

[701] IV, 564.

[702] IV, 565.

 

162

 

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

 

319. Minister Miura Requests Traveling Expenses and Reservations on the Tatsuta Maru

 

Minister Miura on November 26, 1941, asked that a room on the Tatsuta Maru be reserved for him and that traveling expenses be sent as soon as possible. He inquired about the schedule of the Maru, whether the vessel would sail from Los Angeles to Balboa and directly to Japan or would stop at Manzanillo on the way back, as it would be necessary for him to announce the date of his departure. [703]

 

320. Japanese Nationals Request Aid in Obtaining Reservations on Tatsuta Maru

 

On this day he also informed Tokyo that it was virtually impossible to secure visas for Japanese nationals in Mexico to enter the United States. The only method of travel to Panama would be by plane, for all other ways of transportation were difficult to arrange. Since many of the nationals in Mexico had realized that their only opportunity to return home would be via the Tatsuta Maru, they had requested Minister Miura's assistance in obtaining transportation on this vessel. [704]

 

321. Minister Miura Asks that the Tatsuta Maru Load Freight at Manzanillo

 

He further requested that the Tatsuta Maru be directed to stop at Manzanillo to take on 2,000 tons of miscellaneous freight for transportation to Japan. [705]   Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

 

322. Japanese Officials Use Mexico‑Tokyo Diplomatic Channel for Intelligence Routing

 

Since, according to previous arrangements, Mexico City was to be used as an intelligence center by the Japanese to glean useful information from the United States, a Japanese intelligence officer reported on an address made by a United States Marine Corps recruiting officer in Dallas, Texas, on November 26, 1941. It was learned from the address that the United States standing army was 3,000,000, but that 3,000,000 additional reserves were planned and that the production of armaments had been increased accordingly. The United States Marine Corps personnel was now about 62,000 but 100,000 would be needed within one year. [706] Note: This message was translated in 1945.

Furthermore, the Mexican office reported a German language broadcast from London on the night of November 30 stating that England was again dispatching warships to the Far East. Another item sent to Tokyo was taken from an Associated Press dispatch from Manila on December 1 to the effect that American pilots using American planes had recently organized an air unit to protect the Burma Road. [707]

 

323. Tokyo Sends Instructions by Courier Kosaka Regarding Japanese and Manchurian Daily Broadcasts

 

In regard to a previous wire requesting certain instructions which were to have been delivered by courier, Tokyo answered on November 29, 1941, that the instructions were being sent by Courier Kosaka. Having been instructed to impart the knowledge from the Embassy of the United States to Mexico, Courier Kosaka would discuss the reception of Japanese and Manchurian (sic) daily [708a] broadcasts: these would pertain to conditions in

 

[703] IV, 566.

[704] IV, 567.

[705] IV, 568.

[706] IV, 569.

[707] IV, 570.

[708] IV, 571. (Not marked in text.  LWJ)

[708a] IV, 571. DoD Comment: Textual rendition of the message is suspect‑appears in retrospect to be the establishment of a warning system.

 

163

 

Japan and Manchuria; the material would be distributed only in the Mexican Legation and the military and naval attachés' offices; broadcasts received would be put into Japanese text and immediately forwarded to Colombia, Venezuela, El Salvador and Panama. [708]

 

324. Tokyo Wires Formal Authorization for Minister Miura's Return

 

Formal authorization for Minister Miura's return to Japan was wired from Tokyo on December 1, 1941. [709]

 

325. Minister Miura Reports Impossible Reception of General Broadcast

 

On this day Minister Miura reported to Washington that conditions intermittently made it impossible to receive the general broadcasts. He asked that, should a broadcast be intercepted in the code of the caption telegram (named in the heading of this message), it be relayed to him immediately. [710]

 

326. Foreign Minister Togo Instructs Minister Miura to Arrange for Employment of Japanese from Panama

 

Foreign Minister Togo, in a dispatch of December 1, 1941, instructed that Minister Miura arrange for the employment of Japanese from Panama immediately. These instructions were in accordance with the policy of the Japanese government which decreed that as many Japanese as possible should be resettled in Latin and Central American countries rather than be returned to Japan. [711]

 

327. Tokyo Orders Mexico to Limit Expenses and to Use "S" Code

 

Furthermore, the Foreign Minister explained that expenditures in the Mexican Legation would be confined to the limits of the moneys already granted to that office. It was added that circumstances made it necessary to consider the use of the Navy "S" code, which had been explained in a previous circular. [712]

 

328. Minister Miura Discusses with Panama the Employment of a New Staff Member

 

In accordance with instructions from the Home Office, Minister Miura declared that one person would be added to the staff in Mexico. Although the dispatch from Panama had mentioned candidates who would be willing to pay their own fare and to work without salary, the Minister discouraged this, suggesting that Panama provide travel expenses as well as a suitable wage after the appointee's arrival in Mexico. [713]

 

329. Tokyo Makes Plans for the Tatsuta Maru to Enter and Leave Port at Manzanillo

 

On December 4, 1941 Tokyo directed that arrangements be made with the Mexican government to allow the Tatsuta Maru to enter and leave port at Manzanillo. Tokyo ordered that no general freight be loaded. It also asked that negotiations with Mexico be undertaken so that Mr. Minoru Takada, the Foreign Office Liaison official on board the ship, and his aide, Takade Toshiyuki, might obtain entrance permits. [714]

 

[709] IV, 572.

[710] IV, 573.

[711] IV, 574.

[712] IV, 575.

[713] IV, 576.

[714] IV, 577.

 

164