242. Japan Sends Funds for Returning of Families of Japanese Diplomatic Employees
Meanwhile Japan wired that funds had been sent for the return passage for the families of Sadao Iguchi, Matsudaira, Takashashi, Horiuchi, Hiroshi Hori, Morito Morishima, Toyoji Inoue, Shinichi Kondo, Saichi Amano, Hayasida, and Watanabe. [579]
243. American Embassy Requires No Permit for Taking Out Personal Belongings
On December 4, 1941, the Foreign Minister in Japan declared that an officer of the American Embassy had brought to the Head of the American Section on October 14, 1941 a dispatch directing that no permit would be required to take out personal effects, household effects, or personal baggage. [580]
244. Ambassador Kurusu Suggests United States Investigate Western Transportation Company
For Ambassador Nomura's information, a Japanese dispatch of December 4, 1941 declared that eighty or ninety per cent of the materials carried by rail via Burma went to fatten the coffer of Mr. Soong. This was due to the fact that all shipping on the Burma route was a monopoly of the Western Transportation Company, which was in turn controlled by the Soong interest, and that only ten or twenty per cent of the electric freight trains on the route were used for the transportation of materials for the government. This information had come to Japan through a ‑‑‑‑‑ [a], an acquaintance of Ambassador Kurusu. ‑‑‑‑‑ [a] had heard these facts on November 26, 1941 from the Shanghai Branch Manager of the Canadian Pacific. If Ambassador Kurusu suggested to the United States that the Western Transportation Company be investigated, the results of the investigation might dampen United States aid to China. [581]
246. Mystery Dispatch or Coded Wire Sent to Rio de Janeiro
Meanwhile, a dispatch to Rio de Janeiro in plain text sent on December 4, 1941 contained only these words: "Best regards. If you want any money to do any shopping for yourself, let me know by telegram or air mail. (Eisei)". Apparently it was a code message or a disptach between telegraph operators in the two Embassies; the actual meaning of the dispatch was uncertain. [584]
247. Iguchi Asks Permission to Delay Destruction of One Code Machine
The Counselor of the Embassy, Iguchi, in a dispatch to the Chief of the Communication Section, wired the information that codes had been destroyed; but since United States‑Japanese negotiations were yet continuing on this day (December 5, 1941), he requested permission to delay the destruction of one code machine. This dispatch was decoded December 6, 1941. [585]
248. Japanese Officials in Washington Learn That American Marines Will Evacuate Shanghai
Retransmitting a dispatch which had been sent from Peking to Foreign Minister Togo on November 27, 1941, the Foreign Office informed Ambassador Nomura on December 4, 1941 that the American marines would evacuate Shanghai very soon. All would leave except a few who had been trained in air force service. It was estimated that this group would probably go to
[579] IV, 446-447.
[580] IV, 448.
[581] IV, 449.
[a] DoD comment: Name withheld.
[582] Footnote not used in text. LWJ.
[583] Footnote not used in text. LWJ.
[584] IV, 451.
[585] IV, 452.
138
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
Vladivostok as advance troops to lay the ground for the establishment of an American air base there. According to the dispatch sent to Washington the information had been derived from a disclosure by the head of a Marine group. [586] According to the dispatch as sent from Peking, it was a corporal of the Marines who was responsible for the informational slip. [587]
Only a few days before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the Fourth Marines, evacuated from Shanghai, China, arrived in the Philippines aboard the President Harrison. [588] The liner was later seized by the Japanese. [589]
249. Tokyo Orders Terasaki, Takagi, Ando, and Yamamoto to Return to Japan
A dispatch from Tokyo to Washington on December 5, 1941 asked that Secretary Terasaki, Mr. Takagi, Mr. Ando, Mr. Yamamoto and others leave by plane within the next couple of days. This dispatch was read by United States cryptanalysts on December 6, 1941. [590]
250. Consul Morishima Requests Permission for Mr. Hikida to Return Home
Consul Morishima through the Washington Embassy requested permission from Tokyo to return Mr. Deniti Hikida on the Tatsuta Maru. Mr. Hikida was an authority on the Negro problem in the United States and had been utilized by the Japanese propaganda work among the Negroes. He had also served in gathering general intelligence, in investigations and in various other capacities. Since the Consul felt that it would be to Japanese interest for Hikida to return home, he asked authorization to advance him passage for Japan. Because the time of departure was fast approaching, he requested immediate advice. [591]
251. Ambassador Nomura Requests Additional Expense Money
Ambassador Nomura informed his home office also on December 5, 1941 that incidental expenses and secret expenses for the third quarter had amounted to more than $41,000; moreover, the telegraph fund had not been sufficient up to December. He, therefore, requested that one month's allotment limited to the use of the Washington office be transferred by cable. [592]
252. Ambassador Kurusu Asks That Secretary Terasaki Remain in the United States
On December 5, 1941 Special Ambassador Kurusu directed a request to Tokyo that Secretary Terasaki be allowed to remain in the United States since, as organizer of the intelligence setup, he was extremely important in view of the conditions of Japanese‑United States negotiations. Making the request as a personal favor, Ambassador Kurusu said that he would have Terasaki assume his post as soon as he knew definitely that the negotiations were ended. This dispatch was translated on December 6, 1941. [593]
253. Japan Continues Making Evacuation Plans
Mr. Furumoto, managing director of Domei News in Tokyo, instructed his representatives in New York to return quietly to Tokyo by the Tatsuta Maru, and in case such passage were not available, to arrange to go to South America. [594]
[586] IV, 453.
[587] IV, 454.
[588] IV, 455‑456.
[589]Battle Report, plate LVIII.
[590] IV, 457.
[591] IV, 458.
[592] IV, 459.
[593] IV, 460.
[594] IV, 461, 463.
139
Domei official Kato in Washington was also asked to attempt to procure passage on the Tatsuta Maru, the alternative, in case of failure, being an assignment to the South Seas area. [595]
It was reported from New York that Mr. Okamuto would embark for Tokyo at Los Angeles and that Mr. Itamski, being needed in intelligence activities, would return in the same way as the Consulate staff. Decisions regarding Mr. Moriwaki and Mr. Hiramitsu would be made later. This dispatch of December 5 was translated on December 8, 1941. [596]
Meanwhile, on December 6, 1941, Consul Muto in San Francisco asked for further information concerning Tokyo's request for approximately sixty persons aboard the Tatsuta Maru, since the assignment of staterooms would be necessary. [597]
254. Tokyo Clarifies Code Machine Reference
Tokyo advised Counselor Iguchi on December 6 that the reference to code machines in the instructions wired on December 2 had meant that one set of the code machines were to be destroyed and the other retained for the time being. [598]
On the following day Iguchi and his staff as well as Secretary Yuki received a message of appreciation and thanks for their patriotic efforts from Bureau Chief Yamamoto. [599]
255. Japan Issues Its Policy Regarding Allied Diplomatic Officials
Information was disseminated by Tokyo on December 6 and 7 in a circular dispatch concerning its policies applying to allied diplomatic and consular officials, to other subjects residing in Japan, and to publicly and privately owned allied property. Declaring that Japan would approach these matters with the magnanimity of a great nation, it would comply with international law insofar as possible, exercising care that no enemy or third power nations should have cause for retaliatory measures or unfavorable propaganda.
Diplomatic and consular officials would be exchanged for Japanese diplomatic and consular officials resident in allied countries. But until the time of exchange, the telephone would be cut off in diplomatic establishments; consular offices would be closed and sealed and short wave radio and wireless equipment seized in both consular offices and Legations; no inconvenience in daily living would be caused to allied officials. In regard to allied subjects residing in Japan, individuals who were objects of suspicion, military men, seamen, aviation personnel, persons of special technical skill, persons suspected of being foreign spies and all males between the ages of eighteen and forty‑five would be placed under arrest for the present. Caution would be exercised to avoid ill‑treatment of these persons, however, since Japan also had many nationals resident in allied territories.
Publicly owned property held by the Allies in Japan, with the exception of Embassy, Legation and Consular building would be confiscated, although privately owned allied property would not be seized except in the event of general requisitioning.
It was added that diplomatic and consular officials of quasi‑allied countries would be denied the use of codes. Allied diplomatic and consular officials in Manchukuo would be handled in the same manner as were such officials in Japan. [600]
[595] IV, 462.
[596] IV, 464.
[597] IV, 465.
[598] IV, 466.
[599] IV, 467.
[600] IV, 468, 469.
140
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
256. Consul Nihro Desires Settlement of Akino's Fine
On November 25, 1941 Consul Nihro in Manila asked that Japan arrange to advance money to cover the fine of Rafael Akino, a Filipino arrested in Tokyo, or that permission be given to remit the money from Manila. This was requested since Government Official Gonzalo Akino was concerned over the fine and desired to settle the matter without publicity. [601]
257. Consul Nihro Requests Competent Assistants
Foreseeing an increase in the duties of his office which entailed the procurement of military and other information, the dissemination of propaganda, and other machinations, and in order to keep in touch with the inner circles of the Philippine government, Consul Nihro felt that it would be necessary to return Mr. Kihara to Manila as soon as possible. Although, according to instructions, he had let Official Mori take office as Consul to Davao, he requested the appointment of another Japanese for the Davao post, so that Mori could be returned to Manila. Furthermore, the Consul asked that, to assist in the basic investigation plans, he be assigned an American‑educated Japanese as aide. Discussing plans to return Mr. S. Kawaminami on December 8, Consul Nihro declared that even if he stayed in Manila he would not take the place of the men requested above. [602]
258. Tokyo Plans Utilization of Osaka Steamship Company Funds in Manila
A plan to utilize the 83,000 pesos held in bank branches at Manila and belonging to the Osaka Steamship Company was advanced by Tokyo on November 27, 1941. In case the wishes of the company could not be realized and the necessary permit secured to remit the money to Japan, it was suggested that Consul Nihro borrow the money to retain as a secret fund in the Consulate. Japan would, if this plan were accomplished, reimburse the company in Japan. [603]
The resident manager of the Osaka Steamship Company, Mr. Nagawo, reported that the remittance of this fund through purchases was not feasible at the present time. [604] Furthermore, the secret transfer of the 83,000 pesos from the Osaka Steamship branch office to the Consulate was virtually impossible since these deposits were in the name of the local Osaka Steamship Company. [605]
259. Consul Nihro Destroys Useless Codes
On November 29, 1941 Consul Nihro wired that codes for which that office had no use, as well as those of which there were more than two copies had been destroyed on this day. [606]
Since these codes had been destroyed, Consul Nihro informed the Foreign Office on November 30 that it was impossible to decipher a message sent from Tokyo on the previous day. [607]
[601] IV, 470.
[602] IV, 471.
[603] IV, 472.
[604] IV, 473.
[605] IV, 474.
[606] IV, 475.
[607] IV, 476.
141
(blank)
142
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
PART C‑JAPANESE DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITIES THROUGHOUT THE WORLD
(b) Japanese‑Panamanian Relations
260. Diplomatic Corps in Panama Acknowledges New Government
Minister Akiyama wired Tokyo on October 18, 1941 that the entire diplomatic corps, including himself, had made written acknowledgment on October 17, 1941 of the new Panamanian government. The United States alone had made a statement of acceptance without a moment's delay; the Italian Minister was the only one who had hesitated, and even then he had merely declared that due notice had been taken of the matter. In spite of these acknowledgments, Mr. Akiyama reported that the Embassies of the different American countries felt dissatisfied with the change in government. [608]
261. Latin American Countries Deny "Veiled Intervention" by the United States
According to the Mexican and Colombian Ministers, all Central and South American countries were acting voluntarily in taking definite steps against the Axis and were not following the United States. Privately the Colombian Minister had revealed to Minister Akiyama that America's Good Neighbor Policy was ineffective, and that the only course left to the United States was a stricter policing of Central and South America. Furthermore, the Panama government had denied the "veiled intervention" by the United States, which had been intimated in a wire from Foreign Minister Togo on October 11, although Minister Akiyama added that any child could realize that the events were based on a private agreement with the United States. [609]
262. Minister Akiyama Explains New Government's Foreign Policy
The new administration, Akiyama said, would cooperate fully with the United States in regard to relationships between Panamanian territory and the Canal Zone, in the registration of merchant vessels, in the matter of air bases and in the granting of additional advance bases. Consequently, the new government had appointed the Minister to Mexico City as Ambassador to Washington and had put the Minister to Germany, who was rumored to be pro‑Axis, on the inactive list. [610]
Furthermore, the new government had decided that vessels of Panama registry would be permitted to enter belligerent waters, according to recent newspaper reports. The Panama government had directed the German Commerce representative to be "persona non grata" because he had abused diplomatic privileges. Given to understand that requests had been made by the United States for close collaboration for the defense of the Canal Zone and the maintenance of canal service, Mr. Akiyama had been informed by the Minister of Education that Canal authorities were making preparations for such time as war between Japan and the United States would break out. These preparations, he had revealed, were on the basis of instructions from the American government and in conjunction with the change within the Japanese Cabinet. [611]
Calling on Foreign Minister Octavio Fabriga, the Japanese Minister had been told that Panama had decided to defend the various countries on the American continent hand‑in‑hand
[608] IV, 477.
[609] IV, 478.
[610] IV, 479.
[611] IV, 480.
143
with the United
States against Germany. Since the question of Japanese standing as a result of
her alignment with the Axis had arisen, Panama had no choice, should unforetold
events arise, but to assume the same attitude that the United States might take
in her relationships with Japan. [612] Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire
In order, therefore, to render full assistance to the United States, Panama would be forced to take counter measures against Japan should Japanese‑American relations reach the breaking point. The Japanese Minister replied that the new Cabinet in Japan was exerting itself to improve Japanese‑United States relations, and should Japan have to take definite steps in accordance with the "merits" of the case, it was hoped that it would not be necessary for Panama to cooperate with the United States. Foreign Minister Fabriga answered that the Panama government had already decided to take such measures as were necessary to defend itself against Hitlerism. [613]
263. Japanese Business Firms Ordered to Close on October 28, 1941
On October 28, 1941 the Japanese Minister to Panama, in a wire to Tokyo, revealed that eight days earlier he had been informed by telephone that Japanese business firms should cease operation after October 28, 1941. Although the Minister had attempted to interview the Foreign Minister privately in regard to this question, he had not been granted an interview. Consequently, Japanese Official Izawa had called on the Interior Secretary of Foreign Affairs to point out that the exercising of an embargo on Japanese businesses aggravated the present crisis. Declaring that it would be impossible to evacuate Japanese residents in so short a time because of the lack of ships, Mr. Izawa had been told merely that Panama could not grant permits for the continued operation of these firms. Applications made by Japanese business people for a ninety day postponement of the prohibition regulations had been vetoed by the Cabinet at its meeting on this day, October 28, 1941. [614]
It was expected that a complete boycott of Japanese goods would be exercised and that extortion or plundering might ensue, in view of the total discrimination against Japanese residents. Should Japanese shops or businesses open again under the present conditions, penal regulations could be applied. For this reason the Japanese residents in Panama would like to go to Punta Arenas, Costa Rica, or Buenaventura, Colombia, or even Lima, Peru, to board vessels for home. [615]
264. Uncooperative Course of New Government is Result of Fear, Minister Alleges
In examining the new position of the Panama government it might be wise, the Japanese Minister said, to consider the publication by American‑financed newspapers that Japanese nationalists were planning to evacuate Panama as soon as the opportunity presented itself. In view of the friendly cooperation with which Panama had treated Japanese problems in the past, the course now being pursued indicated a fear of arousing the wrath of the United States. The Minister concluded that it was now impossible to place confidence in the intentions of the Panama government, and at the same time it would be difficult to evacuate Japanese nationals since Central and South American countries refused to grant travel permits to Japanese residents in Panama. [616]
[612] IV, 481.
[613] IV, 482.
[614] IV, 483.
[615] IV, 484.
[616] IV, 485.
144
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
Reemphasizing that the actions of Panama seemed to be instigated by the United States, the Minister in his wire of October 30, 1941 revealed that the recent control regulations for the conduct of business were being rigorously enforced. Furthermore, they were taking the attitude that even though business permits would not be granted, should war come, neither would they grant evacuation permits for any Japanese nationalists in Panama. Contributing to Panama's stand was President Roosevelt's alleged fabrication that the Nazis were plotting the establishment of five separate dependencies in Central and South America. The United States was thus instilling in the Panama government the fear that this locality might be used to further such a plot. [617]
265. Panama Restricts Minister Akiyama's Contacts
Insofar as the Japanese Minister's attempts to preserve his personal contacts with various Cabinet members were concerned, the Panama Foreign Office had requested some days ago that he make all contacts through the Foreign Office. He pointed out that the officials seemed not only to distrust his intentions and activities but that they were particularly suspicious of his contacts with the diplomatic corps especially with the Italian and German officials. [618]
When Minister Akiyama had asked the Foreign Minister if he objected to his personal contacts, an awkward silence had ensued. The logical explanation for this conduct was that, as an ex‑editor of the Panama American, the Foreign Minister was trying to attract the good will of the United States. Although in the Minister's opinion Panama was a dependency of the United States, it was being allowed to assume the role of an independent nation and was being permitted, "like a child militantly waving a famous Masamune blade", to work in conjunction with the Canal military authorities. [619]
266. Japanese Minister Says the United States is Urging Panama to Take the Lead
Panama was being permitted, in the name of democracy, to take the fore, being one step ahead of the United States in her hostilities to the Axis powers. Possibly it might even go so far as to sever diplomatic relations, although lacking the strength to effect this act. Panama had armed her merchant vessels and had recalled her diplomatic officials to Germany without considering their replacement. Furthermore, on October 29, 1941 the Foreign Minister had said that a group within the Cabinet had argued that diplomatic relations with Axis powers, including Japan, should be severed; but the majority in the Cabinet had vetoed the suggestion. Panama, as well as all Central and South American countries, at the insistence of the President of the United States, had ordered the dissolution of all Nazi groups. The Foreign Minister had added that Japan was not included in the order possibly because its form of government was not feared, although they considered Japanese government as one form of Nazism. [620]
The United States in preserving her position in various countries in Central and South America seemed to be experimenting by urging Panama into the lead; consequently, Panama's mission was to test the strength of Germany and Italy in Central and South America as well as to measure the extent of Japanese inroads in Central and South America. When, on October 30, 1941, Foreign Minister Fabriga told the Italian Minister that diplomatic relations between the several countries were made difficult by Germany and Italy's sinking of Panamanian vessels, the Italian Minister had replied that until this time Italy had tried so far as possible not to touch Panamanian vessels. [621]
[617] IV, 486.
[618] IV, 487.
[619] IV, 487.
[620] IV, 488.
[621] IV, 489.
145
267. Japan Sends Official Complaint to Panama
Japanese reactions to this Panamanian aggressiveness were revealed in a wire to Panama on November 1, 1941 from Foreign Minister Togo. Mr. Yamamoto, Chief of the American Bureau of the Foreign Office, had sent an official complaint to the Panama Consul, and at the same time Minister Masatoshi Akiyama was instructed to make a strong official complaint to the Panama government in that country. Japan, the Foreign Minister said, would take a firm stand on this matter in view of the effect on other South American countries. Japan would demand that (1) Panama make payment for the loss incurred by forcing Japanese to close their businesses, (2) that Panama would allow a time limit in which the Japanese might clear up their stock, (3) that arrangements for Japanese capital investments should be made, and (4) that Panama should arrange for the entry of these Japanese into other South American countries. It was thought best to advise against Japanese returning to Japan, since it was most important not to break relations with Panama and South American countries at this time. Furthermore, to return home would be to play into the United States' hands. [622]
268. Minister Akiyama Suggests Retaliatory Measures
By November 5, 1941 Minister Akiyama was able to wire that Panama officials were seriously considering Japan's protest, but that they were still trying to chase all Japanese out of their country. Since there was a rumor that the government had received funds from the United States, Panama would no doubt be willing to cooperate with the United States in defending the safety of the Panama Canal. Consequently, it was necessary to make the Japanese protest as strong and as effective as possible. If it were impossible to take over part of Panama for the purpose of protecting the Japanese in that country, then it might become necessary to take over all ships in East Asia flying the Panama flag. If this were done, it would be necessary to maintain the utmost secrecy so that no warning would be served. If this emergency act were carried out, the Panama Consul in the United States would appeal to Washington, so that the Japanese Embassy there should be prepared not to receive this complaint through the United States, but to refer it instead to the Panama government. He asked that his protest be supported in Japan to the full extent when the Foreign Minister made demands of his own upon Minister Herari. [623]
Minister Akiyama had further decided to demand that Panama authorities protect Japanese residents, assure them of a living, and help them to re‑establish themselves in business. Japanese individuals were being instructed simultaneously to stay in Panama for the purpose of making complaints. Although Japan could not tell what attitude would be taken towards its complaint, Minister Akiyama felt that in any event the carrying out of his emergency suggestion would be the best retaliation. [624]
269. Japan Requests Immediate Reopening of Businesses
Since it was clear that Japanese residents were facing increasing hardships in making their living, Minister Akiyama requested the Foreign Minister to open immediately the Japanese shops for business. Meanwhile, he had warned the residents against the indiscretion of illegal business or hiring lawyers, since the authorities might be given a pretext for their deportation. For his own information Mr. Akiyama was interested to know the date on which Minister Fabriga had wired his Minister in Japan. [625]
[622] IV, 490.
[623] IV, 491.
[624] Ibid.
[625] IV, 492.
146
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
270. Radio Broadcast or Domei Service is Suggested to Publicize Panama's Action
Because the Panama newspapers were either owned or controlled by the family of the Minister of Agriculture and Commerce, it could be expected that Japanese announcements as well as their re‑publication would be interfered with. Since criticism would be based on the United States' dogmatic conception of "democracy", Japan should enlighten the people either by radio broadcast or by Domei service. Specifically to be stressed was the fact that the application of the control law was arbitrary; it had been applied three days before it was to have gone into effect, and thus it attempted to drive the Japanese out by the right of prepossession. On November 5, 1941, when someone had appealed to the Minister of Agriculture and Commerce, he had forbidden the opening of Japanese shops even temporarily, [626] and he had cruelly forbidden their engaging in other work. Discrimination in applying the law had been shown to the Chinese and to white foreigners. Not only was the law understood to be applicable only to the Japanese, but the present Foreign Minister, Fabriga, one of the Cabinet's "stooges", had approved the closing of Japanese shops; rivals were attempting to take over the Japanese businesses and the landlords were beginning to demand, since the Japanese were unemployed, that they hand back the shops or auction off the equipment. [627]
271. Tokyo Foreign Office Protests to Panama Minister; Requests Formal Statement from Panama
On November 6, 1941, Foreign Minister Togo wired that Bureau Chief Yamamoto had, on November 1, 1941, protested to the Panamanian Minister Agustin Ferrari in Tokyo with the request that the protest be forwarded to Panama. It was declared that Japan considered this question a serious one, calling for a formal statement from the Panamanian government. Minister Ferrari, replying that he had received no information from his country since the recent change in government, had promised to transmit the request. Foreign Minister Togo declared that he would like to have the details of the question published in Panama as well as in Japan and would wire instructions as to when this was to be done. [628]
272. Panama Cabinet Says Japanese Note is Phrased in Insulting Terms
In the New York Times, under a Panama dateline of November 8, 1941, was a report that the Panama Cabinet had refused to consider the protest by the Japanese Legation against the closing of all Japanese businesses because the note was phrased in insulting terms and constituted intervention in the internal affairs of the nation.
The article explained that the law nationalizing commerce prohibited members of a race not admitted as immigrants to engage in business, thus causing the closing of all Japanese shops. [629]
273. Minister Akiyama Says Japanese Will Have Trouble Disposing of Large Stocks
Since Panama had been a distributing center for Japanese goods, it would be difficult for the Japanese to dispose of large stocks because in addition to the ending of retail sales and re‑exportation of goods required a license which could be granted only when the entire proceeds of the transaction were deposited in a blocked account. Repatriation of the Japanese would be difficult since Japanese ships no longer called at the Isthmus. Warning Panama of the responsibility incurred, the note described the restrictive order as "inhuman cruelty. [630]
[626] IV, 493.
[627] IV, 494.
[628] IV, 495.
[629] IV, 496. (The New York Times, November 8, 1941, "PANAMA REJECTS TOKYO'S PROTEST, Japanese Expulsion from Canal Area to be Continued.")
[630] Ibid.
147
274. Newspaper Article Originating in Japan Charges Panama with Inhuman Acts
The New York Times report from Tokyo publicized the announcement by the Japanese Foreign Office that strong protest had been lodged with the government of Panama against discriminatory and "inhuman" acts which it charged were designed to expel Japanese residents from the Panama Canal area by depriving them of their livelihood. The protests, the article stated, were especially significant since the Japanese government undertook to speak in the name of all Asiatic people and called upon the government of Panama to "revert to a free, independent policy and settle this unpleasant question without being influenced in any way by any foreign power". [631]
275. Japanese Minister Reports Dismissal of Spanish Minister
On November 10, 1941, Minister Akiyama reported to Tokyo that the Spanish Minister was of this date "persona non grata" and that, because of circumstances, it was thought that he could not do otherwise than resign. The reason given for his dismissal was his statement in a public club that "Panama is being trodden on by the iron boot of Uncle Sam. Panama can no longer hold her head high among the family of nations as a sovereign state." It was thought that the United States was back of this action. [632]
The Spanish Minister had informed the Japanese Minister confidentially that he was merely a sacrifice to the new Panama policy of attachment to the United States and that, although he may have been a little disorderly, the question was not big enough to constitute an issue. When he had requested the dean of the diplomatic service to ask the President of Panama not to make an issue of his actions to the Spanish Foreign Office, his request had been shelved. The Spanish Minister has asked that, if possible, this truth be relayed to Spain through him, the Japanese Minister. [633]
276. Mexican Minister Incensed at Treatment of Japanese, Returns Home, Akiyama Declares
Minister Akiyama further reported that the Mexican Minister was returning home since he was extremely enraged at the new regime. In a confidential talk with Japanese official Izawa, he alleged that the continued United States "tutorship" of Panama had made impossible his remaining in office any longer. Of his own volition he had decided that the recent unfair and racial discrimination exercised against the Japanese had made it imperative that he return home. [634]
He questioned whether the Panama government would recognize the diplomatic passport approved by the former Panama President, Arias, or whether through the meddling of the United States, an incident similar to that involving the Spanish Minister might occur. It seemed to him that decisions had been reached to revoke diplomatic rights in Panama. [635]
277. Mr. Izawa Negotiates for Reemployment of Japanese in Panama
In order to make the United States realize the desperate situation of the Japanese in Panama, Mr. Izawa had asked Mr. Kata, head of the Panama Canal, Defense Division, to consider using Japanese in the construction work of the canal. Mr. Kata had answered that this question would be discussed with those in command of the work. From this reply it seemed possible, Minister Akiyama reported, that some kind of work might be procured until Japan could send a ship for them and thus evacuate all Japanese from Panama; at the same time the damage demand for the Japanese government would be lessened. [636]
[631] IV, 496. (The New York Times, November 8, 1941, "Protests Strong, Tokyo Asserts", by Otto D. Tolischus.)
[632] IV, 497.
[633] IV, 498.
[634] IV, 499.
[635] IV, 500.
[636] IV, 501.
148
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
278. Minister Akiyama Suggests Further Retaliatory Measures
Meanwhile, the Japanese Minister had given though to retaliation for the discrimination against Japanese nationals. He suggested, on November 15, 1941, that Japan could (1) Refuse to give permits to Panama ships for sailing out of Japanese ports and to seize or detain Panama ships in Japanese waters, (2) Freeze Panama capital in Japan making it impossible for business to be carried on and (3) Carry out items (1) and (2) in Manchuria and occupied China. Although it would be advantageous to Japan to seize Panama ships, it would be wise, first, to watch the future development of United States‑Japanese relations. [637]
279. Foreign Minister Togo Plans to Aid Nationals
The Foreign Minister in Japan wired Japanese Official Koshi in Panama that the government would consider the expenditure of funds to help the Japanese. In view of the time when relations might become even more strained, thought should be given to a way of moving all Japanese to some other country. It was also requested that the policy of disposing of stock belonging to Japanese companies in Panama be wired to Tokyo. [638]
280. Japanese Military Men Are En Route to Homeland
On November 18, 1941, Minister Akiyama informed Tokyo that Lieutenant Colonel Nakano and Commander Michinori Yoshii, with their party, had left Cristobal safely on November 18, 1941, flying directly to Lima, Peru. Arriving there at 5:30 p.m., they would embark immediately for Japan. [639]
281. Minister Suggests that Young Japanese Nationals be Attached to Central and Latin American Legations
That ten young single men who had been forced to close their businesses because of the Panama incident be appointed to serve in some capacity in Japanese foreign diplomatic establishments was suggested by Minister Akiyama in a circular dispatch of November 19, 1941. If appointments were possible, these men were willing to work without salary and furnish their own traveling expenses. [640]
282. Minister Akiyama Stresses Danger of Communication Stoppage
According to a dispatch transmitted from Tokyo on November 19, 1941, Minister Akiyama reported on November 20, 1941, that should war develop and Panama follow hand‑in‑hand with the United States, there was danger that communications might be stopped. As far as he was concerned, he believed there was no recourse but for Japan to align itself with Argentina, Chile and Peru. [641]
283. Japanese Nationals Urged to Evacuate to Latin American Countries
Because, according to previous dispatches, officials in Tokyo advised that Japanese in Panama be scattered throughout Central and South America rather than be sent home, Minister Akiyama in Panama wired on November 22, 1941 that the evacuation vessel which would touch port at Balboa was being kept a secret from the Japanese nationals. This was done to influence them to resettle in countries near Panama. However, in case the evacuation vessel took off some of the Japanese, he asked that Tokyo officials persuade the United States to order Canal officials to cooperate in the evacuation.
[637] IV, 502.
[638] IV, 503.
[639] IV, 504.
[640] IV, 505.
[641] IV, 506.
[642] IV, 507.
149
284. Arrangements Made for Tatsuta Maru to Dock at Balboa
Having learned through the State Department in Washington that the Tatsuta Maru must pay its expenses in cash when it docked at Balboa, Ambassador Nomura requested Tokyo to have the ship supplied with funds through the Consulate in Panama. [643]
On November 25, 1941, Minister Akiyama reported that not only would permission be granted for the Tatsuta Maru to dock at Balboa but that Panama officials were quite anxious for the ship to come. It was quite clear that Panama officials did not desire even one Japanese to remain near the Panama Canal Zone, although some did undoubtedly choose to remain in Panama in spite of the threat of internment. The Minister inquired about the authority for selling tickets on the Tatsuta Maru, requesting instructions as to whether they should be sold through the NYK or through the consulate. [644]
On November 26, 1941, Foreign Minister Togo felt it necessary to explain that the Tatsuta Maru was not being sent for the purpose of a general evacuation. The fact that it was docking at Balboa meant only that Japan was giving its citizens who could not stay in Panama or settle in other countries a chance to settle in Japan. If Japanese nationals could move to other Latin countries, they were to be guided accordingly, and it was directed that those that were returning home make preparations and those who were going to third countries get their passports. [645]
The consulates in Havana, the United States, Canada, Vancouver and Panama learned on November 26, 1941, the schedule of the Tatsuta Maru. Leaving Balboa on December 26, 1941, it was scheduled to arrive in Yokohama January 15, 1942, although the possibility existed that it would stop in Los Angeles also on the way home. [646]
285. Panamanian Minister Reports Arrival of Peruvian Minister in Washington
The Minister in Panama reported to Washington on November 29, 1941, that Minister Sakamoto, the Japanese Minister to Peru, would arrive in Washington on the night of November 29, 1941. [647]
286. Japan Proposes Reparation for Treatment of Japan Nationals in Panama
Referring to the formal documents demanding reparation for the treatment of Japanese nationals in Panama, Japanese Minister Akiyama reported that the Foreign Minister in Panama had considered the documents neither unreasonable nor without legal grounds, although he answered that the exclusion of Japanese was by popular demand. Acting as authorized spokesman for Panama, the Foreign Minister had told Minister Yamagata and Charge d'Affaires Izawa that there was nothing to do but administer the law; therefore in the ten times Izawa had talked with him the Foreign Minister had opposed Japanese claims and would not give a satisfactory answer. [648]
When Minister Akiyama attempted to get reparations on the basis of a previous understanding with former Foreign Minister Arias, as had been formally suggested by Japan, Foreign Minister Arias had nonetheless testified that Japan had been properly notified of the law many times through her Minister and last November, through the Charge d'Affaires. Since the protest by the Japanese Ministry appeared to be without success, practically all of the Japanese except Amano had sold out their business at a fair price and had returned to Japan. [649]
[643] IV, 508.
[644] IV, 509.
[645] IV, 510.
[646] IV, 511.
[647] IV, 512.
[648] IV, 513.
[649] IV, 514.
150
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
287. Minister Akiyama Communicates with Buenos Aires and Tokyo Regarding Codes
On December 3, 1941, Minister Akiyama directed officials in Buenos Aires to remit a previous dispatch in one code and from then on to use other codes. [650] This dispatch gave the names and addresses of two foreigners in Rio de Janeiro who were receiving American newspapers and magazines. [651]
Apparently having already received instructions concerning the destruction of codes and secret papers, Minister Akiyama reported on December 5, 1941, that code books had been destroyed by burning in accordance with instructions. [652]
288. Minister Akiyama Experiences Financial Annoyances
On December 6, 1941, Mr. Akiyama requested that expense funds through March 1944, be immediately remitted with a monthly special increase of $400 as well as the fourth period sum of $18,185 for the propagation of information. [653]
On December 8, 1941, because of the urgency of the situation, Minister Akiyama made a full report of the income, expenditures, withdrawals, temporary loans, and reserve and estimated future expenses of the Panama office. [654]
[650] IV, 515.
[651] IV, 428.
[652] IV, 516.
[653] IV, 517.
[654] IV, 518.
151
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152
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
PART C‑JAPANESE DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITIES THROUGHOUT THE WORLD
(c) Japanese‑Hawaiian Relations
289. Consul in Honolulu Requests Funds Before Arrival of Tatsuta Maru
In need of funds before the entry of the Tatsuta and Taiyo Marus into Honolulu port, the Japanese Consul in Honolulu asked that funds be wired before October 23, 1941, when the Tatsuta Maru would dock. [655]
290. Japanese Official Requested to Bring Money Back to Japan
Aboard the Tatsuta Maru was Japanese Official Maeda, for whom Tokyo had obtained permission from the American State Department to land in Honolulu and San Francisco. [656] Upon his arrival in Honolulu Clerk Maeda was to be told in absolute secrecy to "bring back that money just as it is". [657]
291. Foreign Office Asks that ‑‑‑‑‑a be Kept Under Strict Surveillance
The Japanese Foreign Office advised Honolulu that another passenger aboard the Tatsuta Maru, ‑‑‑‑‑[a], Tokyo correspondent of the ‑‑‑‑‑[a], was to be kept under strict surveillance while in Honolulu. Since ‑‑‑‑‑[a] actions and words had created various incidents while he was in Japan, if he said or did anything untowardly, the home office was to be advised immediately. [658]
292. Tokyo Suggests National be Assigned to Second Evacuation Vessel
Since there would be room for fifty first class and eighty second class passengers aboard the Taiyo Maru, Tokyo suggested that passengers be assigned to the Taiyo Maru rather than to the Tatsuta Maru. [659] Consequently, a list of available accommodations on the Taiyo Maru, [660] which sailed from Yokohama on October 22, 1941, [661] was dispatched to Honolulu.
293. Special Codes to be Retained as Long as Situation Permits
Foreign Minister Togo, explaining that the special code broadcasts were designed to inform diplomats in the country concerned should ordinary telegraphic channels be severed, directed on November 28, 1941, that the codes be retained as long as the situation in that locality permitted, and until the final stage was entered. [662]
294. Japan Ponders Recall of Staff
On December 4, 1941, the Japanese Consul and his family in Honolulu were instructed to wait at that place pending further instructions. Foreign Minister Togo assured the diplomatic staffs in this circular dispatch that a great deal of thought was being given to the return of the Consul's staff and families. [663]
[655] IV, 519.
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