(Part 2 of 4.)
Persons in the border areas should secure passport visas before it becomes too late and begin to perform their duties.
3. In my considered opinion, the persons carrying on the activities of the aforementioned route should make possible the transference and contact between our espionage net in the United States and our officials here in Mexico which can be done most effectively in Mexico. In cooperation, therefore, with army and naval authorities, offices should be established in Laredo, El Paso, Nogales, and Mexicali. Conferences have been going on with army and naval officers in regard to this matter. If this is to be done, much planning will be required with parties in the United States who will be getting in contact with me. With this in mind, on the occasion of a recent trip to the United States, I stopped off in New Orleans and Houston, and from what I learned there in those places, such a thing hadn't been given the slightest consideration.
Trans. 9‑16‑41
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THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
No. 402
FROM: Mexico (Miura) July 4, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 245.
Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire
(Part 3 of 4. )
http://LOUIS1J1Sheehan1Esquire.US
When I was in Washington, the official in charge of this matter, after establishing Washington and New York areas in the espionage net, made the statement that he would like to wait for a little while before making a tour for contact purposes. Since that time until today, the question stands as it did then. Furthermore, in regard to Los Angeles, when Minister YAMAGATA's party recently passed through there, he was told that they had no acquaintanceship with such things as intelligence nets, and for that reason they had made no special plans. Since then, all of these offices, on the instructions of the home office ‑‑‑‑‑ ‑‑‑-- gradually are bringing their plans to a head for ‑‑‑‑- -----. At the present time, as far as civilian agents are concerned it will be impossible to make (it ?) more concrete.
Trans. 9‑16‑41
No. 403
FROM: Mexico (Miura) July 4, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 245.
(Part 4 of 4.)
In reading your message on the intelligence route matter, I have received the impression that ‑‑‑‑‑ ‑‑‑-- there is no clear distinction made between the question of this route and the establishment of an intelligence net in this country dealing with the United States (with regard to the details of this latter matter, I will wire my humble opinions separately). However, it is clear that the question of the intelligence route does not imply the establishment of the espionage net in the United States by civilian agents. This is definitely a function of the diplomatic offices in the United States and is absolutely impossible for us here in Mexico City to bring into being. Army and naval officers here feel that the questions are quite apart and separate. In order that we not work at cross purposes, however, I am inquiring for additional information.
Trans. 9‑16‑41
http://LOUIS1J1Sheehan1Esquire.US
No. 404
Louis J. Shehan, Esquire
FROM: Mexico (Miura) July 22, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 286.
Re Part 1 of your # 349 [a] to Washington.
In my # 236 [b], I told you more about the advantages and disadvantages of using Mexicali. To confer with me on the matters mentioned in my # 278 [c], I had TERAZAKI, ITO, and KATO come back there, and we again looked into the situation. We decided that our previous conclusions were based on peacetime and that in case there is an emergency, Mexicali would probably not be a good place as the basic point for routing because of the following considerations:
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(1) Mexicali is far away from headquarters, and not only are airplanes the only convenient means of transportation, but also communications are very bad. If something started, we would not even be able to use American planes.
(2) Four days would be necessary for contact by railway.
(3) In Mexicali there is not one single daily newspaper, and we could only rely upon American‑Mexican journals so all the news that came to our ears would be late. Another thing, Lower California is now, to all intents and purposes, under the jurisdiction of Southern California, and in case something began to pop, it would be inevitable that the United States would bring tremendous pressure to bear. To tell the truth, the activities of Japanese citizens in the border cities are even now being subjected to the closest scrutiny, so in time of crisis, Mexicali would be no place for any activities of ours.
I have transmitted this to Washington.
[a] See II, 411.
[b] In which KATO of Mexicali says that if intelligence work is to be carried on in Mexicali, it will be necessary that both funds and personnel be reorganized. He also tells of the difficulty of intelligence work in a border town. See II, 393.
[c] Regarding the protecting of Japanese nationals residing in Mexico in case of war.
Trans. 7‑25‑41
No. 405
FROM: Washington July 19, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 534.
Re your # 387 [a].
Secretary Terasaki has already left for Mexico. How shall we handle this item? Please wire.
[a] Terasaki was to have taken some codes to Mexico that Ambassador Shigemitsu brought from London.
Trans. 7‑28‑41
No. 406
FROM: Mexico July 26, 1941
TO: Panama # 8.
Secretary TERASAKI left here the 26th arriving at your place the 27th.
Trans. 8‑16‑41
No. 407
FROM: Mexico (Miura) July 26, 1941
TO: Washington # 41.
Secretary TERASAKI left today for South America.
Relayed to Tokyo, Caracas, and ‑‑‑‑‑.
Trans. 8‑2‑41
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THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
No. 408
FROM: Mexico (Miura) July 27, 1941
TO: Rio de Janeiro # 3.
Secretary TERASAKI left here yesterday for your place by air and expects to arrive August 2nd. He will stop off three days in Panama and three days in the Port of Spain.
Trans. 8‑1‑41
No. 409
FROM: Mexico (Miura) July 28, 1941
TO: Rio de Janeiro # 4.
Diet Member SHINOHARA left here on the 28th and will be accompanied from Panama by Secretary TERASAKI.
Louis J. Shehan, Esquire
